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It can be stated that the US defense establishment rediscovered the African continent after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington DC.  The end of the Cold War 
changed the dynamic between the United States and many African countries as US foreign engagement 
with the continent retrenched.  Whereas, the United States had provided substantial military and economic 
support to allied countries in an effort to counter the Soviet Union’s presence on the continent, the Cold 
War’s conclusion ended the need for those arrangements.  In addition, the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone that began in 1989 and 1991 respectively coupled with the loss of US servicemen in Somalia and 
the genocide in Rwanda gave credence to Robert Kaplan’s controversial exposition entitled “The Coming 
Anarchy.”  Kaplan’s article had a profound effect on the US foreign policy establishment judging that 
President Bill Clinton ordered the US State Department to disseminate it to all US embassies.  It could be 
argued that sentiments such as these contributed to the reluctance of the United States to engage 
substantially with Africa after the Berlin Wall fell.  Sounding the alarm on what he perceived as the dawn 
of unparalleled instability and chaos in the global south, Kaplan invoked stereotypes of Africa as the dark 
continent.  His imagery of sub-Saharan Africa depicted a savage and dangerous place where notions of 
“civilization” had collapsed.1 
 
The United States’ reluctance to commit to large and sustained, military, economic and political 
engagement in Africa pre-9/11 changed after Al Qaeda launched its attacks on the US homeland from its 
base in Afghanistan.  The hijacking and destruction that followed reoriented the nature of US-Africa 
engagement.  September 11th demonstrated the value of failed states as safe havens for terrorist 
organizations, creating the impetus to deny terrorist groups sanctuary in other parts of the world.  Failed 
states and those experiencing internal turmoil were identified as potential places where terrorist 
organizations could regroup and plan future operations.  Africa with a large land mass consisting of fifty-
four countries became a major concern for US policy makers.  To that end, the Pentagon, at the direction 
of President George W. Bush, created the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 as the lead military 
initiative to deny terrorist groups a home in Africa.  Recognizing how the governance deficit, endemic 
corruption, large scale unemployment and natural disasters were weakening African states, AFRICOM 
sought to reverse this trend through an assortment of development initiatives designed to 
“professionalize” African armies, enhance security and promote good governance.  From the beginning, 
questions have been raised regarding the appropriateness of engaging the US military in development 
projects or to promote governance across Africa.  Jessica Piombo’s edited volume entitled The US 
Military in Africa assesses the US military’s role in development and security initiatives across Africa 
after September 11th, 2001. 
 
This book is the result of a workshop funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced 
Systems and Concepts Office.  It is the collaborative effort of experts with specific knowledge on the 
various aspects of the Pentagon’s and US foreign policy establishment’s engagement with African 
countries after 9/11.  The organizations examined are AFRICOM, the US Department of Defense, the US 
Department of State and USAID.  The general format used by the authors is to provide an overview of 
their chapter, state the problem and then anaylze the US’s engagement with the specific challenge while 
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identifying the pros and cons of such action.  Thematically, the authors address four main topics:  can the 
US military facilitate development, “professionalize” African armies, be an effective partner in cross-
agency coordination and facilitate good governance?  Some of the authors have based their analysis on 
participant observations as is the case with the chapter by Maureen Farrell and Jessica Lee.  Farrell and 
Lee have used the insight that they gained on field studies in Kenya and Tanzania to frame their analysis 
on interagency collaboration.  Like Ferrell and Lee, G. William Anderson focuses his study on 
interagency cooperation.  However, his is a more detailed account on the technical, mechanical and 
procedural aspects of interagency interaction.  His contribution is essential to the book because it provides 
the context with which to understand the principles guiding interagency collaboration.  Furthermore, he 
provides the framework with which to evaluate the effectiveness of interagency cooperation or the lack 
thereof.    The volume’s strongest contributions are the chapters by Andrea Talentino, Dustin Sharp, 
Andrea M. Walther-Puri and Piombo.  Their command of the nuances and dynamics of African security 
issues are at a very advanced level.  Talenino leads with a sober examination of the theoretical framework 
of the book, i.e. whether development in sub-Saharan Africa can be securitized through militarization.  
She debates the prospect of the militarization of development while discussing the feasibility of the 
opposite.  In the process, she studies the logic driving the creation of AFRICOM and how the command’s 
mandate was developed and implemented.  Talentino’s work stands out because of her extensive 
knowledge of development implementation.  She is clearly an expert in this area and uses her 
understanding of development work to examine AFRICOM’s process in it.  Her contribution along with 
those of Sharp and Piombo are arguably the most impactful studies in the book.   
 
Piombo follows Talentino with a more historically based analysis on the US defense establishment’s 
purpose and its evolving role in stability and reconstruction operations in sub-Saharan Africa.  To 
accomplish this, she focuses on the politics of development and humanitarian aid juxtaposed military led 
initiatives.  Assessing her work, the strength of her argument is that it provides the intellectual foundation 
to form a big picture analysis of the US defense establishment’s development strategy in Africa.  In this 
regard, it segues nicely into Sharp’s chapter.  In his contribution, Sharp calls attention to the paradox with 
US military assistance to African countries.  Mainly, is it advisable to train armies in countries where the 
leadership is authoritarian?  Given the experience of US military assistance to Mobutu Sese Sekou’s Zaire 
or Samuel Doe’s Liberia, which in the end contributed to the destabilization of the region, will training 
Paul Biya’s (Cameroon) or Joseph Kabila’s (DR Congo) security forces lead to the same?  He accurately 
states that in most African countries where the US is engaged in military partnerships, the concept of a 
social contract between the government and the governed does not exist.  Sharp correctly identifies that 
without a social contract, the United States risks enabling regime protection.  His concern is that training 
the defense forces of countries whose leadership have no sense of social welfare or accountability to their 
citizens leads to increased repression over time.  While he does offer advice, mainly that before 
meaningful adjustments can be facilitated, political reform must come from the bottom up, he states that 
the status quo will have the unintended consequence of strengthening authoritarian regimes.  Walther-Puri 
furthers the argument by implying that development initiatives driven by the US military risks 
destabilizing African countries.  Her most compelling example is that the elite Malian troops trained by 
the United States eventually undermined democracy in Mali when they used their training to conduct a 
coup d’etat.  She lists various reasons for the unintended results; however, the most compelling is that the 
United States lacks a historical connection to Africa.  This by implication signifies that since Americans 
are generally unfamiliar with Africa, political and military expedient decisions are being taken 
irrespective of the nuances involved or the long-term effects of US military assistance.  As a remedy, both 
Anderson and Walther-Puri suggest that the United States should exercise extreme caution in forming 
military partnerships in Africa.    
 
In contrast, Clarence Bouchat offers the most spirited argument on the merits of a US military led 
development and security initiative in Africa.  His over-reliance on Thomas Barnett, who he claims is an 
expert at global conflict forecasting undermines his case.  While Barnett is an accomplished scholar, his 
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projections of future conflicts are not suited to Africa.  It could be stated that Barnett’s analysis lacks a 
clear understanding of the political realities of sub-Saharan Africa.  Furthermore, Bouchet’s suggestion 
that US personnel become proficient in economics leads one to wonder why he did not insist that the 
emphasis be placed on an understanding of African affairs instead.   
 
While the authors present a thorough account of their respective areas, more historicizing would have 
been helpful to contextualize the challenges facing the Pentagon.  We are reminded that Africa suffers 
from a democracy and governance deficit.  We are also informed that African armies lack respect for civil 
authority, but the exact reasons for this are not explored at length.  For example, to understand why there 
is a disconnect between civilian authority and the defense forces in sub-Saharan African countries, the 
traditions and post-colonial realities inherited by the military from its role as a colonial army needs to be 
understood.  Mainly, that they were oriented inward, and second that in most instances post-colonial sub-
Saharan African armies were not included in the democratization process at independence.  In some 
cases, the military was not released from the colonial authority until the day of independence.  As such, 
the army was not integrated into the national strategy.  As a result, two opposing locales of power were 
manifested in post-colonial African states, the army and the government.  Given that the role of the army 
was not defined and, furthermore, it was not included in the democratization process, the army followed 
its own corporatist agenda.2  The result was that there have been over two-hundred coups and attempted 
coups since 1963.   
 
An interesting aspect of this book is that we can weigh the relevance of the different analysis to the 
situation on the ground.  This volume was published in 2015 and judging by the security situation in 
Togo, Cameroon, DR Congo, Somalia, Uganda, and Ethiopia it appears that those who had advocated 
strict conditions for the US partnerships have so far been validated.  Presently, there appears to be a shift 
to enhanced regime protection as we witness crackdown on political and ethnic opposition in those 
countries. 
 
The US Military in Africa is the most informative and comprehensive book on this subject.  Simply put, it 
is the best thus far.  Unlike Nick Turse’s Tomorrow’s Battlefield:  US Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in 
Africa and Helen Epstein’s, Another Fine Mess, that could be considered polemic, The US Military in 
Africa offers a sober analytical assessment of the role of the Pentagon in development and security 
operations on the continent.  
 
Piombo certainly has the experience and academic credentials to lead this project.   Although her 
expertise is in security affairs and political activity in the southern African region, she displays a 
commanding knowledge of how these issues affect Africa continent-wide. She has conducted research in 
several African countries and was a visiting scholar at the University of Western Cape, the University of 
Cape Town in South Africa, Stanford University’s Center for African Studies and George Mason 
University’s Center for Conflict Resolution.  This book should be required reading for all personnel in the 
US military and foreign policy establishment engaged with security and development operations in 
Africa. 
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